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LOUISA C. Ml'SKOPF ct al., Appellants, v. CORNING 
IIOSPIT A L DISTRICT, Respondent. 
[1] State of California-Liability.-The rule of governmental im-
munity from tort liability must be discarded as mistaken and 
unjust. 
[2] Hospitals-Tort Liability.-A hospital is not protected from 
tort liability by thc rule of charitable immunity, this doctrine 
having been abolished. 
[8] State of California-Liability.-The state, like a municipality, 
can act in n proprictary capacity. 
[4] HospItals-Actions Against.-A suit against a county hospital 
or hospital district is against an entity legally and financially 
capablc of satisfying a judgment. 
[5] State of California-Liability.-The rule of governmental im-
munity for tort is an anachronism, without rational support, 
and has existed only by the force of inertia. It does not 
actually exist, but has becomc riddled with exccptions both 
legislative and judicial, and the exceptions operate so illogi-
cally as to cause serious inequality. 
[6] Hospitals-Actions Against.-Since the Legislature has by 
virtue of Health & Sa f. Code, § 32121, subd. (b), set forth the 
manner [all actions and proceedings] and the courts [all 
courts] in which suits against a hospital district may be 
brought, in such suits judgment may be entered against the 
hospital district. 
[7] State of California-Actions Against.-Const., art. XX, § 6, 
providing that suits may be brought against the state in such 
manner and in such courts as shall be directed by law, should 
not be interpreted as establishing the rule of immunity; it 
provides merely for :J. legislative consent to suit. 
[8] Id.-Actions Against: Hospitals-Actions Against.-Although 
Gov. Code, § 6U, allowing the state to "sue or be sued," and 
Health & Saf. Code, § 32121, subd. (b), permitting a hospital 
[IJ See Cal.Jur.2d, State of California, § 155 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
States, Territories and Dependencies, § 73. 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Hospitals and Asylums, § 18; Am.Jur., 
Hospitnls an(l A~yJulll~, § 18. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3,5, 9-12] State of California, § 57; 
[2, 14] Hospitals, § S; [4, 6] Hospitals, § 15; [7] State of Cali-
fornia, § 67; [8] State of California, § 67; Hospitals, § 15; [13J 
State of California, § 58; [15] Public Officers, § 6L 
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district "to 8ue and be sued," have been judicially constnletl as 
providing ouly a wniver from suit nnd not a wuiver of substan-
tive immunity, their continuous reenactment indicntes a clear 
legislative purpose to remove all procedural obstacles when 
the state is liable. 
[9] Id. - LiabilitY.-Statutes removing governmental immunity 
from liability in certain areas should be interpreted as meaning 
only what they say: that in the areas indicated there shall be 
no governmental immunity; they leave to tne court whether it 
should adhere to its own rule of immunity in otJ.1er areas. 
[10] Id.-Liability.-From the inception of the "nile" of govern-
mental immunity from liability there has been constant judi-
cial restriction going hand in hand with accompanying legi;;-
lative rcstl'iction, the concept of proprietary acts bas been 
extended to the state and its agencies, and there is govern-
mental liability for nuisances even when they involve govern-
mental activity. 
[11] Id.-Liability.-In formulating "rules" and "exceptions" re-
lating to governmental immunity from liability, it should be 
borne in mind that when there is negligence the rule is lia-
bility, immunity is the exception. 
[12] Id.-Liability.-Abrogation of governmental imlUunity from 
liability does not mean that the state is liable for all hanns 
that result from its activities. Both the state and individuals 
are free to engage in many activities that result in harm to 
others so long as such activities are not tortious. 
[13] Id.-Liability.-Although it "is not a tort for Government 
to govern" and basic policy decisions of government within 
constitutional limitations are therefore necessarily non tortious, 
it does not follow that the state is immune from liability for 
torts of its agents. Once it is determined that the state 
through its agents has cOlllmitted a tort, it must meet its 
obligations therefor. 
[14] Hospitals-Tort Liability.-The employees of a hospital dis-
trict are not immune from liability for their negligence in 
caring for and treating a paying patient in a hospital operated 
by the district. 
[15] Public Officers - Civil Liability.-Go,'ernmcnt officials are 
liable for the. negligent performance of their ministerial duties, 
but are not hable for their discretionary acts within the scope 
of their authority, even if it is alleged that they acted mali-
ciously. Such immunity is not designed to protect the guilty, 
but rests on the ground that it is impossible to know whether 
the claim is well founded until the case has been tried and that 
[15] See Cal.Jur.2d, Public Officers, § 144 et seq.; Am.Jur., Public 
Officers, §§ 289.5, 303 et seq. 
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it would be better to lrave unrrures:-ed the wrongs done by 
dishonest officers than to ~ubjeet those who try to do their duty 
to the constant dread of retaliation. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tehama 
County. Curtiss E. Wetter, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for injuries sustained by a paying 
patient in a hospital operated by defendaut hospital district. 
Judgment for defendant after general demurrer to complaint 
was sustained and plaintiff refused to amend, reversed. 
P. M. Barceloux, Burtoll J. Goldstpin, Goldstein, Barce-
loux & Goldstein and Rpginald M. Watt for Appellallts. 
Glelln D. Newton and "\VilJiam W. Coshow for Respondent. 
Stanley Mosk, Attol"lwy General, Charles A. Barrett, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Frederick G. Girard, Deputy 
Attorney General, Dioll Il. Holm, City Attorney (San Fran-
cisco), William l<~. Bonrne and Beatrice Challiss, Deputy City 
Attorneys, Jenuinbrs, Engstrand & Henrikson and Paul D. 
Engstrand, Jr., as Amiei Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plailltiff Louisa C. Muskopf was a paying 
patient ill the Corning Memorial Hospital. She and her hus-
band allege that because of the negligl:'llCe of the hospital staff 
she fell and further injured the broken hip for which she was 
being' treated. Defendant demurretl on the ground that the 
Corning Hospital District is im!l1une from liability for tort 
under the rule of Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospi-
tal District, 41 Ca1.2d 33 [257 P.2d 22], which held that a 
hospital district was a state agency exercising a governmental 
function and as such was immune from tort liability. Defend-
ant's demurrer was sustained, and upon plaintiffs' refusal to 
amend the court entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs 
appeal. 
Plaintiffs contend that operating a hospital is a proprietary 
function of government and that in any event the rule of 
goYcrlllllcntal inlllllmity sllon1<1 hc dist'ardl'd. 
[1] After a reevaluation of the rule of governmental im-
munity from tort liability we ltuye coneluded that it must be 
discarded as mistaken and unjust. 
The rule of ho~pital district tort immunity was based on 
) 
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('ases upholding county hospital immunity. (Shcl'bounle v. 
Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113, 114-115 [81 Am.Dec. 151] ; Calkins 
v. Newton, 36 Cal.App:2d 262,264-268 [97 P.2d 523] ; Griffin 
v. County of Coll/sa, 44 Cal.App.2d 915, 919-922 [113 P.2d 
270.) Thcse cases rcst on the grountls that a county, like the 
state, can act only in governmental capacity and that a hospital 
is proteetcd by the rule of charitable immuuity. [2, 3] The 
latter doctrine has becn abolished in this state. (Silva v. 
Providence Hospital, 14 Ca1.2d 762, 764-776 [97 P.2d 798] ; 
Malloy v. Fong, 37 Ca1.2d 356, 364·367 [232.P.2d 241]), and 
it is now settled that the state, like a municipality, can act in 
a proprietary capacity. (People v. Superior Court, 29 Ca1.2d 
754, 761-762 [178 P.2d 1, 40 A.L.R.2d 919].) Subsequent 
to the Talley case, other decisions of this court have expanded 
the area of the statc's proprictary activities. (Guidi v. State. 
41 Ca1.2d 623, 626-628 [262 P.2d 3] ; Pianka v. State, 46 Ca1.2d 
208, 210 [293 P .2d 458].) 
The shifting fortune of the rule of governmental immunity 
as applied to hospitals is illustrative of the history of the 
rule itself. From the beginning there has been misstatement, 
confusion, and retraction. At the earliest common law the 
doctrine of "sQvereign immnnity" did not produce the harsh 
results it does today. It was a rule that allowed substantial 
relief. It began as the personal prerogative of the king, gained 
impetus from sixteenth century metaphysical concepts, may 
have been based on the misreading of an ancient maxim, and 
only rarely had the effect of completely denying compensa-
tion.1 How it became in the United States the basis for a 
rule that the federal and state governments did not have to 
answer for their torts has been called '( one of the mysteries 
'Sovereign immunity began with the personal prerogatives of the King 
of England. In the fcudal structure the lord of the manor was not Bub· 
ject to suit in his own courts. (1 Pollock and Maitland, The History of 
English Law [1909 ed.] 518.) The king, the highest feudal lord, en· 
joyed the same protection: no court was above him. (1 Pollock and 
Maitland, The History of English Law, supra, at pp. 512·517; 3 Holds· 
worth, History of English Law (1D22 ed.) 462.) Before the sixteenth 
century this right of the king was purely personal. (Watkins, The State 
as a Party Litigant 12 [Johns lIopkin~ {;niversity Studies in History 
and Political Science, Series XLV, No.1 (H)27)].) Only out of sixteenth 
century mctaphysical concepts of the nature of the state did the king's 
personal prerogative become the sovcreign immunity of the state. (Wat-
kins, The State as :t Party Litigant, slIpra, at p. 11; see 4 Holdsworth, 
The History of English Law, supra, at pp, I!fO·19i.) There is some c\'i-
elenee tbat the original meaning of n'e \IT<' sixtcpnth ('"ntl1ry maxim-
that the king can do no wrong--was mcrely that the king was not 
privileged to do wrong. (Borchard, Corcrnlllrllia/ Rc-,ponsilJility in Tort, 
34 Yale L.J. I, 2; Ehrlich, Procc0dings Against the Crown (1216·1377) 
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of legal evolution." (Borchard, GOL'ernmental Responsibility 
in Tort, 34 Yale L.J., I, 4.) 
The rule of county or local district immunity did not 
originate with the concept of sovereign immunity. Thc first 
case to hoM that local government units were not liable for 
tort was Russell v. Men of DCl"ct1l, 100 Eng.Rep. 359. The 
case iuvolyed au actiou in tort agaiust au unincorporated 
county. The action was disallowed on two grounds: since 
the group was uuincorporated there was no fund out of which 
at pp. 42, 121 [Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, vol. \'1 
(1921) ].) 
The immunity operated more as a laek of jurisdiction in tlle king's 
courts than as a denial of total relief'. There was jurisdiction, however, 
in the Court of Exchequer for equitable relief against the crown. " •.• 
the party ought in this case to be relieved against the King, beeause 
the King is the fountain and head of jUlltice and equity; and it shall 
not be presumed, that lie will be <lefecti\""e in either. And it would dero· 
gatc from the King's bon our to imagine, that what is equity against a 
common person should not be equity against him." (Per Atkyns, B., 
Pawlett v . ..!I.ttomey General (1668), Hadres 465, 468, 145 Eng.Rep. 5,jO, 
552; Dyson v . .dttorney·GeneraZ (1912),1 K. B. no, 415.) 
The method for obtaining legal relief against the crown was tbe 
petition of right. The action could not be brought in the king'8 courts 
hecause of tbeir lack of jurisdiction to bear elaims against him. The 
petition of right sta.ted a claim against the king, whicb was barred only 
by his prerogative. To the petition •• there must always be a reply: 
'Let right be done,' .. (Holdsworth, The History of Remedies .dgaiMI 
The Cr01L'n, 38 L.Quar.Rev. HI, 149) and " .•• it is clear tllat the 
petition has assumed tbe character of a definite legal remedy against 
the Crown." (ld. at p. 150.) There were procedural difficulties with 
the petition, but alternate remedies existed in large part. (let at pp. 156-
161.) 
The main use of the petition of right in the early common law was 
in real actions, which then covered a wide field. (Holdsworth, Remedies 
4.gain8t The CrOW1/" supra, at p. 152.) The basic principle was that the 
petition was proper "whenever the subject could show a legal right to 
redress." (ld. at p. 156.) 
Tbe early precedents may even be read as allowing a petition of right 
against the king for the torts of his servants. (See the cases of Robert 
(1325) and Gervais (1340) de Clifton, discussed in Ehrlich, Proceedings 
Against The Crown, supra, at pp. 123·126; Watkins, The State as a Party 
Litigant, 8upra, at pp. 20 n. 36.) In Tobin v. The Queen (1864), 16 
C.B.N.S. 309, 111 Eng. Com. Law Rep. 309, however, the court refused 
to so read the precedents, and held tbat the crown was not liable for 
the torts of its servants. This decision arose because of the fOTDlalistic 
and mistllken idea tbat concepts of vicarious liability did not apply to 
the crown. (See Holdsworth, Remedies .dgain8t The CrolL'n, supra, at 
pp. 294·296; Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant, 81/pra, at p. 25.) 
Under the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, however, the crown is today 
liable for the torts of its servants to the same extent as private persons. 
(Hals. Laws of England, vol. XXXII, §§ 21)3 A, B [Cum. Sup. 1953}.) 
One otber protection was afforded the subject injured by the king's 
servants. Many of tile king's officers were liable for the wrongs com· 
mitted, and from the earliest times tbose officers bad to have a sufficient 
financial standing to Dlake those remedies against them meaningful. (See 
Ehrlich, Proceedings Against Tbe Crown, supra, at pp. 200, 214.) 
) 
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the judgment could be paid; and" it is better that an irHli· 
vidual should su:,;tain an injury than that the public 8hon1l1 
suffer an inconvenience.': (100 Eng. Rep. 359, 862.) The 
rule of the Russell ease was first brought into this country h~' 
Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 249 [6 Am.Dec. 63]. Thcl'e 
the county was incorporated, could sue and be sued, and there 
was a corporate fund out of which a judgment could be satis-
fied. Ignoring these differences, the Massachusetts court 
adopted the rule of the Russell case, which became the general 
American rule. 
If the reasons for Russell v. Men of Devon and the rule of 
county or local district immunity ever had any substance 
they have none today. [ 4] Public convenience does not 
outwcigh individual compensation, and a suit against a county 
hospital or hospital district is against an entity legally and 
financially capable of satisfying a jUdgment. Thus, it was 
judicially recognized in England over half a century ago 
that a public hospital is liable for its torts. (Hillyer v. St. 
Bartholomew's Hospital (1909), 2 K.B. 820, 825.) 
[5] The rule of governmental immunity for tort is an 
anachronism, without rational basis, and bas existed only by 
the force of inertia. (See Borchard, Governmental Responsi-
bility for Tort, 84 Yale L.J. 129, 229; Casner and Fuller, 
Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 IIarv. L. Rev. 437; 
Repko, Commentary on Municipal Tort Liability, 9 Law & 
Cont. Prob. 214.) It has been judicially abolished in other 
jurisdictions. (Molitor v. Kanel.and Community U'nit District 
No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11 [163 N.E.2d 89,90-96] ; Colorado Racing 
Com. v. Brllsh Racing Assn., 136 Colo. 279 [316 P.2d 582, 
585-586] ; Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach (Fla.), 96 So.2d 
130, 132-134 [60 A.L.R.2d 1193].) 
None of the reasons for its continuance can withstand 
analysis. No one defends total governmental immunity. In 
fact, it does not exist. It has become riddled with exceptions, 
both legislative (Gov. Code, §§ 50140, 530.)1; l~d. Code, § 903; 
Veh. Code, § 17001) and judicial (Chafor v. City of Long 
Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 481-483 [163 P. 70, Ann.Cas. 1918D 
106, L.R.A. 1917E 685] ; People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.2d 
754, 761-762 [178 P.2d 1, 40 A.L.R.2d 919]), and the ex-
ceptions operate so illogically as to cause serious inequality. 
Some who are injnred by governmental agencies can recover, 
others cannot: one injured while attending a community 
theater in a public park may recover (Rhodes v. City of Palo 
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injured ill a children's pla.'·groUllllmil.\' not (Far/"dl Y. City 
of Long Beach, 132 Cal.App.2d 818, 819-820 [283 P.2d 296]j ; 
for torts committed in the course of a n governmcntal fnnc-
tion" there is no liability, unless the tort be classified as 
a nuisance (Phillips v. City of Pa.sadena, 27 Ca1.2d 104, 100 
[162 P.2d 625]). The illogical and inequitable extreme is 
reached in this case: we are asked to affirm a rule that denies 
recovery to one injured in a county or hospital district hos-
pital, although recovery may be had by one injured ill a city 
and county hospital. (Beard v. City ff County of San Fran-
cisco, 79 Cal.App.2d 753,755-768 [180 P.2d 744].) 
Artidc XX, section 6 of the California Constitution pro-
vidl.'S: "Suits may be brought against the State ill such manner 
and in such courts as shall he directed by law." [6] Health 
and Safety Code, section 32121, subdivision (b), provides that 
a hospital district shall have the power "To sue and be sucd 
in all courts and places anel in all actions and proceedingi' 
whatever." Since the L('gislature has set forth the manner 
[all actions and proceedings] and the courts [aU courts] in 
which suits against a hospital district may be brought it 
would seem to follow that in such suits judgIllent may be 
entered against the hospital district. 
Previous cases, however, have differentiated between the 
state's consenting to be sued and its substantive liahility, and 
have hc1<1 that the language used in section 32121, subdivision 
(b), and ill article XX, section 6, gives only the state's con-
sent to be sued and does not waive any defenses or immuni-
ties. TIm>;, an 1893 statute (Stats. 1893, p. 57, now Gov. COde, 
§ 641) providing that those having claims for negligence 
against the state were authorized "to bring suit thereon ... " 
was held not to waive the state's sovereign immunity but only 
to give its consent to be sued when it was otherwise liable. 
(Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316, 319 [55 P. 10001, citing 
Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690, 693 [38 P. 457, 43 Am.St. 
Rep. 158]; :'Ild/Jin v. Staff', 121 Cal. 16, 23 [53 P. 416].) 
[7] It is contellded, howen-r, that arti('le XX, section 6, 
should be interpreted as also having snbstantiye signifirance 
and establishing the rule of immunity. Such an interpretation 
would he contrary to People v. Superio/" Court, 29 Cal.2d 754, 
761-762 [178 P.2<1 1,40 A.L.R-2rl 91!l1, Guidi v. State, 41 Cal. 
2d 623, 626-6~8 r262 P.~tl 31, anil Pianka v. State, 46 Cal.2d 
208, 210 [293 P.2/1 4381. whit·h extendrd thc state's 1iability 
to its proprietary activities. If the section has any substan-
tive significance it would appear to be a waiver of immunity. 
.. 
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On its face it seems to say that the state may be held liable 
when suits are brought against it in aecordanec with a legis-
lath'ely prescribed procedure. Consistent, however, with our 
previous construction of essentially identical statutory lan-
guage, we hold that article XX, section 6, provides merely for 
a legislative consent to suit. 
It is streuuously urged, however, that it is for the Legis-
lature and not the courts to remove the existing governmental 
immunities. Two basic arguments are made to deny the 
court's power: first, that by enacting various lttatutes affecting 
immunity the Legislature has determined that no further 
change is to be made by the court; and second, that by the 
force of stare decisis the rule has become so firmly entrenched 
that only the Legislature can change it. Neither argument is 
persuasive. 
The doctrine of governmental immunity was originally 
court made. [8] The Legislature early adopted a statute 
allowing the state to "sue or be sued" (Gov. Code, § 641) 
and a similar statute applies to hospital districts (Health & 
Saf. Code, § 32121, subd. (b». Although those statutes have 
been construed as providing only a waiver from·suit and not a 
waiver of substautiye immunity (!lclvin v. State, 121 Cal. 
16, 23 [53 P. 416]), their continuous reenactment indicates a 
clear legislative purpose to remove all procedural obstacles 
when the state is liable. 
The state has also enacted various statutes \vaivilig substan-
tive immunity in certain areas. (Gov. Code, § 53051 [dan-
gerous or defective condition of pnblic property] ; Gov. Code, 
§ 50140 [damage by mobs or riots] ; Ed. Code, § 903 [liability 
of school district] ; Veh. Code, § 17001 [public agency liability 
for negligent operation of motor vehicle J.) Defendant con-
tenils that by removing immunity in these areas the Legisla-
ture has retained it in all others. 
'We are not here faced with a situation in which the Legil'!-
lature has adopted an t'stahlished judirial interpretation by 
repeated reenactment of a statute. (Richfield Oil Corp. v. 
Pllblic rtiliflJ Com., 54 Ca1.2d 4]9, 430 [6 Cal.Rptr. 548,354 
P.2d 4J.) Nor are we faced with a comprehensive legislative 
I'naetmrnt designed to tOYer a field. What is hefore us is a 
i'!C'ries of sporadic statntC's, each operating on a separate area 
of govC'rnmC'lltal immunity wherC' its evil was felt most. 
[9] Defendant "'ouM haY!' UI'! sa.v that because the Legis-
lature has l'<>lllowd ~()v('l'nmC'lItal immunity in these areas 
we are powC'rlC'ss to rrlllOY(' it in othrrs. We r<'ad the statutes 
as meaning only what thC'y sa~': that in the areas indicated 
) 
) 
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there shall be no gOVl'l'llll1cntal immuuity. They leave to the 
court whether it shoul!l adhere to its own rule of immunity ill 
other areas. 
[ 10] Defemlant also urges that even if the Legislature 
has not adopted the rule of governmental immunity ill the 
areas ill whieh it lIas not rxpl'essly abolished it, the rule has 
existed for so long that only the Legislature has the power to 
change it. The" rule" of governmental immunity, however, 
has not existed with the force that its repetitiol1 would impl~-. 
From its inception there has beeu constant judicial restrietioll, 
going hand in hand with accompanying legislative restridiOll. 
Municipal corporations were first held subject to the court's 
equitable jurisdiction (Sprillg Valley Wafer Works v. City &-
Coulity of San Francisco, 82 Cal. 286, 307-311 [22 P. 910, 16 
Am.St.Rep. 116, 6 L.RA. 756]). They were then held liable 
for their proprietary aets (Chafor v. City of LOllg Beach, 174 
Cal. 478, 481-483 [163 P. 70, Anu.Cas. 1918D 106, hR.A. 
1917E 685]), "'hit'll ha\'(' b,'rl1 eonstantly expanlll'(l. Thus, 
a community theater in a public park (Rho£1rs ". Cily of Palo 
Alto, 100 Cal.App.2d 336, 341-342 [223 P.2d 639]) ; a public 
golf course (Plaza v. City of Sail Mateo, 123 Cal.App.2tl 103, 
106-112 [266 P.2d 523]) ; an electric lighting plant (Dat'oust 
v. City of .Lllalll('da, 1·19 CaL 69, 72·74 [84 P. 760, 9 Ann. Cas. 
847, 5 L.R.A. N.S. 536]) ; and the furnishing of impure water 
(Ritferbtrseh v. City of Pittsbu/'{}, 205 Cal. 84, 86-88 [269 
P. 930, 61 .A.r..R. 4481), haye all furll isht>d the basis for 
municipal liability. Moreover, the concept of proprietary 
acts has been cxtcnded to the state and its agencies (People Y. 
Superior Court, 29 Ca1.2d 7M, 761-762 [178 P.2d 1, 40 .A.L.R. 
2d 919]), and the liahility of the state under tbat ('onccpt is 
increasing. (Guidi v. State, 41 Ca1.2d 623, 626-628 [262 P.2d 
3]; Pianka v. State, 46 Cal.2d 208, 210 [293 P.2d 458].) 
Finally, there is gOVl'rnmental lial)ility for nuisances even 
when they involve governmental activity. (Phillips v. City 
of Pasadena, 27 Ca1.2d 104, 106 [162 P.2d 625}.) 
[11] In formulating "rules" and "exceptions" we nre 
apt to forget that when there is negligence, the rule is liability, 
immunity is the exception. This conrt implemeut('d that poli(~y 
when it overruled the doctrine of charitahle immullity. (SilM 
v. Providence Hospital, 14 Ca1.2d 762, 764-776 [97 P.2<l 798] ; 
MaUoy v. Fong, 37 CaL~M 356, 364-367 r232 P.2<l 241]), an 
immunity that was also claimed to he so fil'mly imbrddr<1 that 
only the L('gislature could change it. 
[12] Abrogation of governmental immunit.y does not 
) 
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mean that the state is liable for all harms that result from its 
activities. Both Ihr state allll individuals are free to engage 
in many activities that result in harm to others so long as snell 
activities are not tortious. Thus the harm resulting from 
free competition alllollg individuals is not actionable, nor i,'i 
the harm resulting from tIle diversion of business by the state's 
relocation of a higll\\"a~·. (People v. SyI/lOIl,~, 54 Cal.2d 85:), 
859 [9 Cal.Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451] ; Hollotcay v. Purcell, 
35 Ca1.2d 220, 230 [217 P.2d 665].) It does not follow, 
however, that torts may 110t be committed iI}. carrying on 
such activities. A competitor may be liable for the harm re-
sulting from his violation of traffic laws in getting his product 
to market, just as the state may be liable for the harm caused 
by its agents' violation of such laws. [13] Although it "is 
not a tort for Government to govern" (Jackson, J., dissenting 
in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 [73 S.Ct. 956, 
97 L.Ed. 1427]), and basic policy decisions of government 
within constitutional limitations are therefore necessarily non-
tortious, it does not follow that the state is immune from liabili-
ty for the torts of its agents. These considerations are relevant 
to the question whether in any given case the state through its 
agents has committed a tort (see 3 Davis, Administrative Law 
(1958), § 25.11, p. 482; § 25.13, p. 489), but once it is de-
termined that it has, it must meet its obligation therefor. 
Nor does our decision herein affect the settled rules of im-
munity of government officials for acts within the scopc of 
their authority. [ 14] Moreover, since defendant's em-
ployees are not immune from liability for their negligence in 
caring for and treating plaintiff, the question of the extent to 
which the state shoilld be immunc when its officers are is not 
involved in this case. (See L1:pman v. Brisbane Elementary 
School Disf., post, p. 224 [11 Ca1.Rptl'. 97,359 P.2d 465].) 
[15] GOYCrtlll1eut officials are liable for the negligent per-
fOl'mallc·c of their ministerial duties (1llock v. Santa Rosa, 
126 Cal. 330, 334 [58 P. 826] ; Payne v. Baehr, 153 Cal. 441, 
414 [95 P. 895]) but are not liable for their discretionary 
nds within the scope of their authority (Downer v. Lent, 6 
Cal. 94, !J5 [95 Am.Dec. 4891 ; NCH'pOI·t WTtfll',f & Lbr. CO. Y. 
Drew, 141 Cal. 103, 107-108 [74 P. 697] j Oppenheimer v. 
Arnold, !J9 Cal.App.2d 872, 874 [222 P.2d 940] ; JIartelli Y. 
Pollock, 162 Cal.App.2d 655, 659-660 [328 P.2d 795]), even 
if it is alleged that they acted maliciously (White v. Towers, 
37 Cal.2d 727, 730-732 [235 P.2(1 209. 28 A.hR.2d 636]; 
Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal.2d 315, 322 [239 P.2d 876]; 
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Hardy v. Vial,48 Ca1.2d 577,582-584 [311 P.2d 494]). Such 
immunity is not designed to protcct the guilty, for" if it were 
possible in praetice to confine such complaints to the guilty, 
it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification 
for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim 
is well founded uutil the case has been tried, and that to 
submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the 
burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, 
would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the 
most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties . 
. . . In this instance it has been thought in the end better 
to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers 
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant 
dread of retaliation." (Learned Hand, J., in Gregoire v. 
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581; see also Hardy v. Vial, 48 Ca1.2d 
577,582-583 [311 P.2d 494].) Thus this immunity rests on 
grounds entirely independent of those that have been ad-
vanced to justify the immunity of the state from liability 
for torts for which its agents are admittedly liable. 
Only the vestigial remains of such governmental immunity 
have survived; its requiem has long been foreshadowed. For 
years the process of erosion of governmental immunity has 
gone on unabated. The Legislature has contributed mightily 
to that erosion. The courts, by distinction and extension, 
have removed much of the force of the rule. Thus, in holding 
that the doctrine of governmental immunity for torts for 
whieh its agents are liable has no place in our law we make 
no startling break with the past but merely take the final step 
that carries to its conclusion an established legislative and 
judicial trend. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-As recently as 1958 this court, 
in Vater v. County of Glenn, 49 Ca1.2d 815, 820 [4] [323 
P.2d 85] (per Chief Justice Gibson, with only Justice Carter 
dissenting), although it expressly recognized that there has 
been much learned criticism of the principle of governmental 
immunity, held that" abrogation or restriction of this doctrine 
is primarily a legislative matter." And Talley v. Norfhet'll 
San Diego County II ospital Dist. (1933), 41 Ca1.2d 33, 41 
[15] [257 P.2d 22] (per Justice Shenk, with only Justice 
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Carter dissenting), upon facts materially identical with those 
of the present case, held that "Whcther the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity should be modified in this state is a 
legislativc question." Also this court, ill denyiug pctitionK 
for hearing after decisions of the District Courts of Appeal, 
has during the last decade frequently adhered to this view.! 
But today's majority, apparel1tl~- impatient with the Legis-
lature's failure to act as speedily and eomprehensiyely as 
they believe it should, usurp the legislative fuuction, rcfuse 
reasonable respect for the doctrine of sta1'e dec·isis, and sweep-
ingly allUOUllee (a Itt c, p. 21:3) that "A [tel' a rcc\'aluution 
of the rule of governmental immunity from tort liability we 
have concluded that it must be discarded as mistaken and 
unjust."2 
Our state Constitution, the instrument which rules (or 
should rule) our decisions, provides (art. III, § 1), "The 
powers of the governmellt 0f the State of California shall 
be divided into three separate departments-the legislative, 
executive, and judicial; and no person l:harged with the ex-
ercise of powers properly belonging to one of these depart-
ments shall exercise any functions appertaiuing to either of 
the others, except as in this Constitution expressly directed 
or permitted. " 
It appears that the Legislature specifically intended that 
a governmental unit such as the one sued here-a hospital 
district--should not be liable for the torts of its employes 
under the principle of respondeat s1lperior. Since this court 
held in the Talley case (1953), supl'a, 41 Ca1.2d 33, 40 [14], 
that substantive immuuity was not abolished by subdivision 
(b) of section 32121 of the Health nnd Safety Code (which 
provides that hospital districts have power "To sue and be 
sued in all courts and places and in all actions and proceed-
1County 0/ Butte v. Superior Court (1960), 178 Cal.App.2d 310, 311 
[2 Cal.Rptr. 913] (hearing denied); Ingram v. County Of Glenn (1960), 
177 Cal.App.2d 649, 650 [I, 2] [2 Cal.Rptr. 3041; Durst v. County of 
Collisa (19;38), 166 Cal.App.2d 623, 62.3 [1] [;~33 P.2d 789] (11caring 
deniell); Madison v. City .s- COllnty of San Francisco (1951), 106 Cal. 
App.2d 232, 244-24;; [234 P.2d 99;;, 236 P.2d In 1 (hearing denied); 
Latham v. Santa Clara COllnty lIo.~pital (1951),104 Cnl.App.2d 336, 331 
[1] [231 P.2d 513] (hearing denied). 
"Thc scope of this pronouncement is (lefined by the further statement 
(anl(', 1'- !!20) that "!\or docl$ our ael'isiun her('in nffect the sC'ttkd 
rulC's of immunity of government offi~hlls for nets within the scope of 
their authority. Moreo\-er, sinre (lcfen<lnnt's eruployl'(,s nrc not immune 
from liability for their nq~ligcucc in caring for amI trl'ating plnintiff, 
the qnestion of the extent to. which the state should be immune when its 
officers are is not iuvolved in this cnse. (See Lipman v. Brisballo Ele-
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ings whatever"), four umelllimeu ts of section 32121 have be-
come effective (Stats. 1949, eh. 964; Stats. 1951, ch. 536; Slats. 
1953, ch. 1208; Stats. 1957, ch. 641) and several other sections 
concerning the powers of hospital districts have been amended 
or added, but the Legislature has refrained from providiug 
for their tort liability in a situation such as that in Talley 
and the preseut case. (Au even more direct example of 
legislative recognition of, and failure to abolish, governmental 
immunity is found ill the 'Vater Code sections considered in 
the Vater case (1958), supra, 49 Ca1.2d 815, 818-819 [3].) 
While this court was repeatedly holding that abolishment 
of governmental immunity was a legislative question, the 
Legislature enacted various statutes which reduced such im-
munity in certain fields but did not abolish it, and enacted 
and reenacted statutes which dealt with the related problem 
of suability of the government; therefore, it should be con-
cluded that the Legislature agreed with this court that the 
questions should be resolved by statute rather than judicial 
decision. (See Richfield Oil Corp. v. Public Util. Com. (1960), 
54 Ca1.2d 419,430 [2] [6 Clll.llpt1'. :>48, 354 r.2d 4].) 
" • [1]n adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed 
to have had knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions 
and to have enacted aud amended statutes in the light of such 
decisions as have a direct bearing upon them.' [Buckley v. 
Chadwick (1955),45 Ca1.2d 183, 200 [14] (288 P.2d 12, 289 P. 
2d 242).J The failure of the Legislature to change the law 
in 8 particular respect when the subject is generally before 
it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of 
an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not 
amended." (Cole v. Rush (1955),45 Ca1.2d 345, 355 [8,9) 
[289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137J.) Yet the majority refuse 
to apply the just quoted rules and say instead that the "con-
tinuous reenactment" of section 32121 (suhd. (b» indicates 
only "a clear legislative purpose to remove all procedural 
obstacles when the state is liable." (Allte, p. 218.) An 
informed refusal to respect either the doctrine of stare decisis 
or the constitutional division of powers seems manifest. 
One of the grounds upou which the majority seek to justify 
their invasion of the legislative province is that statutory and 
judicial exceptions to the governmental immuuity doctrine 
"operate so illogically as to cause serious inequality." (Ante, 
p. 216.) 1 had thought that the Legislature could abolish 
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done, without judicial interference with its efforts, so long 
as the unevenness of the legislation was not so great as to be 
unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, I am impelled to comment that it is un-
fortunate that a court's reversal of itself on a point of law 
which it has recently and repeatedly considered should appear 
to depend upon a change of personnel. A change of court 
personnel is not, in my concept of judicial duty (under our 
historie form of government), properly to be regarded <ll> 
carte blanche for the judiciary to effectuate either a constitu-
tional amendment or legislative enactment. . Such power, I 
think, should be exercised only by the People or by representa. 
tives directly responsible to them. 
Because I believe that the question of abolishing govern-
mental immunity is for the Legislature, I would affirm the 
judgment. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
21, 1961. Scbauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
